ينفي Squid دوره في اختراق وحدة Gnosis Safe بقيمة 3.2 مليون دولار

Opening

A third-party module connected to the Gnosis Safe ecosystem was exploited across Ethereum and Base networks, draining approximately $3.2 million from 86 different Safes in two hours. The vulnerable contract, verified on Basescan as "SquidRouterModule," initially sparked confusion due to its name association with Squid protocol. However, Squid clarified that the contract was not built, deployed, or operated by the project, and that the module independently integrated with Squid and other protocols without direct project involvement. Security firms Blockaid and PeckShield were among the first to report details of the incident, which exploited a flaw in the module's signature verification mechanism.

Exploit Mechanics

The vulnerable module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a transaction message was secure. By passing this value, attackers were able to bypass signature verification mechanisms and execute arbitrary call data from victim wallets. This flaw gave attackers the ability to spend tokens held in affected Safes without requiring legitimate wallet approvals.

Security researchers determined that the exploit relied on Foundry-based exploit contracts that targeted the module's DelegateBundler execution path. According to Blockaid, the attackers impersonated authorized delegates tied to each Safe and initiated arbitrary token swaps through Uniswap V3 liquidity pools.

Asset Conversion and Current Status

The stolen assets were converted into an attacker-created worthless token known as "u" through specially seeded liquidity pools controlled by the exploiter. After routing the assets through these pools, the attacker removed liquidity and consolidated the proceeds into approximately 3.07 million DAI. PeckShield stated that the funds are currently being held in a wallet beginning with "0xa447...54859."

توضيح سكِويد

انتقد سكِويد التقارير العامة المبكرة التي ربطت الاختراق بشكل غير صحيح مباشرةً ببروتوكوله. وقال المؤسس المشارك لسكِويد، وهو شخص يَستخدم اسمًا مستعارًا (Fig)، إن الوحدة المُعرّضة للخطر كانت غير مرتبطة ببنية سكِويد الأساسية. ووفقًا للفريق، ظلت بنية جهاز التوجيه الرئيسي للبروتوكول منفصلة تمامًا ولم تتأثر بالاختراق. ووضح سكِويد أن العقد القابل للاستغلال كان يشارك فقط اسم سكِويد، وجرى دمجه بشكل مستقل مع عدة بروتوكولات، بما في ذلك سكِويد، دون مشاركة مباشرة من المشروع نفسه.