Aave leads the effort to fill the 68.9万 ETH gap—DeFi is undergoing system-level stress testing

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Author: Climber, CryptoPulse Labs

On April 24th, Aave, in collaboration with several institutions, launched a rescue plan called “DeFi United,” primarily to address the approximately $292 million loss caused by the KelpDAO vulnerability attack, in order to prevent bad debt from continuing to spread.

The attack mainly stemmed from a vulnerability caused by the integration between KelpDAO and LayerZero, where hackers forged uncollateralized rsETH and borrowed about $190 million worth of assets on Aave. This led to collateral distortion and a run on the system, with the platform’s TVL once evaporating by about $10 billion.

Currently, Lido Finance, EtherFi, and founder Stani Kulechov have proposed capital injections. Aave has already secured support of 43.5k ETH in potential backing, helping to stabilize the DeFi lending system, but a gap of approximately 68.9k ETH still remains.

What was originally a technical security incident is now rapidly evolving into an industry test of trust. When there are no central banks, no mandatory mechanisms, and no last-resort lenders, can this system truly repair itself?

1. The vulnerability is not the key point; the real issue is: Is there really not enough money?

The cause of the incident is actually very clear.

The security event surrounding rsETH caused a significant imbalance in Aave’s asset structure. The hacker borrowed through the lending mechanism, withdrawing 99.6k ETH, which is equivalent to directly removing a core liquidity component from the system.

The danger of such operations is that they are not traditional asset thefts but exploit the rules to borrow money. From the protocol’s perspective, this asset was indeed legitimately borrowed, but from the overall system’s view, it is no longer within the available range.

Fortunately, a critical “stop-loss” was triggered on-chain afterward.

On Arbitrum, about 30.7k ETH was successfully frozen. This to some extent prevented further loss expansion and bought time for subsequent handling. But even so, there remains an undeniable figure on the books—roughly 68.9k ETH of actual shortfall.

The significance of this number lies in its certainty: it is neither an expected loss nor an unrealized profit, but a clear existing funding gap. In other words, without external supplementation, this hole will not disappear on its own.

More importantly, this gap can quickly propagate into a trust issue. Users won’t analyze complex technical details or dissect lending models. They will simply ask the simplest question: Is the money I deposited still safe now?

Once this question is repeatedly raised, the risk has already begun to spread.

The operation of lending protocols fundamentally depends on confidence that can be withdrawn at any time. As long as users believe they can retrieve their funds, the system can remain stable.

But once confidence wavers, it enters a familiar path. First, small amounts of funds are withdrawn, then the outflow accelerates, eventually leading to structural pressure.

And the market’s response is already beginning to show.

Aave’s total deposits have significantly declined after the incident, with liquidity margins tightening. This change is not an instant collapse but a typical slow death. Every withdrawal amplifies the system’s instability.

This is also why the core issue of this event is not how much was stolen, but a more fundamental question: when a DeFi protocol faces a real funding shortfall, does this system have the capacity to self-repair?

2. “DeFi United”: An experiment in rescue without a central bank

Faced with the shortfall, Aave did not choose to wait for the market to self-correct.

Instead, it proactively initiated a symbolic action—establishing a joint rescue mechanism called “DeFi United.”

This step essentially involves doing something common in traditional finance but rarely seen on-chain: introducing external liquidity support.

In traditional systems, this role is usually played by a central bank.

When financial institutions face liquidity issues, there are clear safety nets. But in the world of DeFi, such a role does not exist.

Thus, this attempt becomes an alternative: industry-leading protocols collectively assume the role of the last lender.

A somewhat unusual scene emerged: protocols that originally competed in different sectors began to express support collectively:

Lido Finance offers 2,500 stETH (proposal stage)

EtherFi Foundation offers 5,000 ETH (proposal in progress)

Stani Kulechov personally commits 5,000 ETH

Golem Foundation offers 1,000 ETH

Mantle plans to provide 30,000 ETH (currently the largest single contribution)

Additionally, projects like Ethena, LayerZero, Ink Foundation, Tydra, and others have publicly expressed support.

In scale, this is a significant “blood transfusion” effort. The potential support scale is about 43.5k ETH. If fully realized, it could cover most of the shortfall.

But the problem remains clear: it still cannot fully fill the 68.9k ETH gap.

More importantly, the status of these funds is not entirely uniform.

Some are already committed in terms of promised contributions, but some are still at the governance proposal stage awaiting community voting. Others have only expressed support without specific amounts.

This makes the entire rescue mechanism somewhat uncertain. It is directionally established but still uncertain in execution.

Nevertheless, this mechanism is already significant because it first clearly demonstrates a possibility: DeFi can attempt to respond to systemic risks through cross-project collaboration.

Why are these protocols willing to step in? The reason is not complicated.

Aave is not an isolated protocol; it is a core node in the entire DeFi liquidity network. If it encounters problems, the impact will spread outward—such as pressure on staked assets, disruptions to re-staking structures, and potential volatility in stablecoin collateral systems.

In other words, this is no longer just a project issue but a risk source that could affect the entire ecosystem.

Therefore, the essence of this joint rescue is not just to help Aave get through the tough times but to prevent cracks from forming in the entire DeFi credit system.

3. The real test: Can DeFi survive the “trust crisis”?

As the event develops, the problem shifts from a funding issue to a structural one. This crisis is becoming a critical test for DeFi.

Let’s return to the key question: can the funding gap be fully filled?

If yes, Aave’s asset-liability balance will be restored. Market confidence will gradually recover, and capital flows will stabilize.

But if not, even a partial gap will leave hidden risks.

The market will not be reassured just because most of the gap has been filled; it will only focus on one outcome—whether the risk has been thoroughly eliminated.

Secondly, the mechanism itself faces a test. Will “DeFi United” become a long-term solution?

At least for now, several structural issues remain.

For example, it lacks enforceability. All participant contributions are voluntary. If market conditions change, whether commitments will be honored remains uncertain.

Another issue is the lack of standardized rules. There are no clear contribution ratios, trigger conditions, or reward mechanisms. Each rescue effort requires re-coordination, which limits efficiency and stability.

Then there’s the scale limit. The current shortfall is about 68.9k ETH. But if larger risks emerge in the future, whether this mechanism can cover them remains unknown.

These issues also determine one thing: this mechanism is currently more like a temporary solution rather than a mature industry-wide rescue system.

But even so, it still holds significant meaning. Because it provides a direction—whether DeFi can spontaneously form a risk-sharing mechanism without centralized backing.

This event can be viewed as an on-chain stress test. It does not directly determine the industry’s success or failure but influences how the market perceives it.

If the rescue succeeds, it could bring several changes: for the first time, DeFi forms cross-protocol risk response mechanisms; the creditworthiness of leading protocols is restored or even strengthened; and the market’s trust boundary for on-chain finance is expanded.

But if it fails, the consequences are equally clear: user trust in lending protocols declines, funds further withdraw from high-risk structures, and systemic risk premiums in DeFi rise.

Deeper still, users may start reconsidering a fundamental question: Is DeFi a system capable of supporting large-scale assets over the long term?

Conclusion

On the surface, this is a shortfall of 68.9k ETH. But on a deeper level, it is a major test of how trust can be rebuilt.

In an environment without central banks or regulatory safety nets, leading DeFi projects are answering a core question with the most primitive approach: when risks truly materialize, can this system save itself?

The answer is not yet fully revealed, but it is certain that regardless of success or failure, this attempt will require more time and effort to repair and rebuild.