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Warren Buffett steps down, Greg Abel takes over Berkshire Hathaway for 100 days: the management style of the investment empire is being rewritten
Warren Buffett’s new CEO Greg Abel has been in office for 100 days, demonstrating a management style more aggressive than Buffett’s. He has restarted the buyback program, redefined Apple and three other companies as core holdings.
According to The Wall Street Journal, within just 100 days of taking office, the investment empire built by Warren Buffett over decades at Berkshire Hathaway has already begun to show significant changes. To the market, Greg Abel is not only Buffett’s designated successor but also the person who will determine Berkshire’s capital allocation, subsidiary governance, and investment style over the next decade.
The 63-year-old Buffett successor, Berkshire Hathaway CEO Greg Abel
Greg Abel is 63 years old and officially took over as Berkshire Hathaway CEO this January. While he repeatedly emphasizes that Berkshire’s core culture, values, insurance business foundation, integrated corporate structure, and the CEO-led stock investment model will remain unchanged, The Wall Street Journal bluntly states that the reality is: change has already begun, and it is happening with direction and rhythm.
Abel has promoted close associates, promised to use most of his higher-than-Buffett salary to buy Berkshire stock, restarted the nearly stagnant buyback program since 2024, and further expanded Berkshire’s presence in Japan, even acquiring shares of a local insurance company.
Insiders: Abel is more involved in management than Buffett
The most notable aspect of this report is how it depicts the fundamental difference between Greg Abel and Buffett—not in their value investing philosophy, but in their management style. Buffett has long been perceived externally as highly decentralized, with minimal interference, even willing to tolerate underperforming managers to avoid unpleasant personnel issues. Greg Abel, on the other hand, is not like that.
Sources familiar with Berkshire’s internal operations say Abel is more “hands-on” than Buffett—meaning he is more deeply involved in the business, more proactive in details, and has higher expectations for subsidiaries, holdings, and senior executives. If someone cannot meet his standards, he is less tolerant than Buffett and may even dismiss them if necessary.
This makes Greg Abel a more typical modern corporate manager, rather than just an extension of a legendary investor. His background explains this style: born in the Canadian prairie, with a typical North American Midwest pragmatic and straightforward personality. He has long managed Berkshire’s non-insurance businesses, especially closely linked to Berkshire Hathaway Energy, and has been honed through large industrial and utility systems.
He is not just someone who looks at capital markets but understands how to manage railroads, energy, utilities, industry, and large dispersed corporate groups. Therefore, when he took over Berkshire, the outside world saw not a philosophical continuation but a familiar operator, familiar with performance management and organizational accountability, beginning to truly get his hands into this giant enterprise.
Abel has shown a more assertive stance than Buffett
The report mentions that during the transition period before officially taking over, Abel already signaled a change in atmosphere internally. In December last year, at an employee lunch, someone directly asked whether he would move Berkshire’s headquarters out of Omaha. Such a question would have been almost unthinkable in Buffett’s era, but it reflects that everyone knows a “new era is coming.” Abel responded on the spot that he would not move the headquarters, but the question itself was enough to indicate internal expectations for changes after succession.
In terms of working style, Greg Abel also demonstrates a high level of involvement. Although Berkshire’s headquarters is in Omaha, he currently lives in Des Moines, Iowa, with no immediate plans to move to Omaha—at least until his son graduates high school. This means he often makes multiple trips between the two locations weekly, with a two-hour one-way drive.
More importantly, he spends a lot of time on the company aircraft managed by Berkshire’s NetJets, flying across the U.S. to visit subsidiary managers. This highly mobile, frequent inspection approach is typical of a strong operational leader.
Greg Abel redefines Berkshire’s core holdings
From an investment perspective, Abel’s first significant signal is that he is beginning to redefine Berkshire’s “core” and “non-core” investments. In his first shareholder letter on February 28, he explicitly named Apple, American Express, Coca-Cola, and Moody’s as core holdings.
This statement is crucial because it not only reaffirms Berkshire’s concentrated investment strategy but also signals to the market: under Abel’s era, Berkshire’s stock investments will still be concentrated, but not all large holdings are viewed equally. The report even points out that Bank of America and Chevron are not considered on the same level as the four mentioned core positions.
In Abel’s era, Berkshire’s investment decisions may become more “focused”
At the same time, Abel has begun to organize the investment structure left over from the transition period. The report notes that he has liquidated Todd Combs’ managed stock positions. Combs, one of Buffett’s two investment managers, recently moved to JPMorgan Chase. Interestingly, the report suggests Abel is unlikely to hire new investment managers to assist with the portfolio management.
What does this imply? It suggests that future stock investment authority at Berkshire may be even more centralized in the CEO’s hands than in Buffett’s later years. For the market, this means decision-making efficiency will improve, and Abel’s personal judgment will more directly influence Berkshire’s holdings.
But what will truly define Abel’s historical position is probably not whether he adjusts holdings but how he uses Berkshire’s record-breaking cash reserves. The report states Berkshire currently holds $373.1 billion in cash. For any successor, this is both an opportunity and a pressure.
Long-term shareholders may not care whether Abel continues Buffett’s style; they are more concerned about whether, during the next deep recession, he will be willing to deploy more aggressively than Buffett in his later years. Long-term Berkshire investors like Chris Bloomstran openly say that their real expectation for Greg Abel is that he has the courage to put $300 billion into the market and that he should be more active than Buffett in his later years.
This is also the key point to observe about Greg Abel. Because Berkshire is not an ordinary company; it is one of the few global capital allocation machines that simultaneously holds insurance float, massive cash, complete industrial assets, and high market trust. Buffett’s core ability was not just stock picking but making large decisions to generate high returns at low cost during market panics. Whether Abel can inherit this ability will determine if he is merely “a manager after Buffett” or if he can become “a capital allocator after Buffett.”
Additionally, Abel has spent a lot of time over the past year focusing on one of Berkshire’s most important foundations: the insurance business. The report notes he is prioritizing learning Berkshire’s extensive insurance system and has been closely interacting with Ajit Jain, who has long managed the insurance operations. Jain is expected to continue leading the insurance division, but Berkshire has also planned a succession for him. This indicates Abel is not only focused on his familiar energy and industrial sectors but is consciously filling in his knowledge of Berkshire’s core engine—insurance.
Abel’s test: the next recession is the real challenge
From a personal image perspective, Abel somewhat continues Buffett’s Midwestern affability. The report mentions he loves hockey, still coaches his son’s team, and during the Olympics, he supported both the Canadian men’s team and the U.S. women’s team to avoid taking sides. These details make him seem pragmatic, approachable, and down-to-earth—traits that align well with Berkshire’s long-standing humble culture.
But don’t be fooled by this gentle surface. The Wall Street Journal’s true portrayal is of a successor who does not shy away from conflict. Sources familiar with Abel say he believes in autonomy and decentralization, respects Berkshire’s traditional de-centralized model, but this does not mean he will tolerate underperforming units dragging down the organization.
In simple terms, Abel does not intend to replicate Buffett and Munger’s past tolerance for underperforming subsidiaries. If some businesses underperform long-term, are singled out, restructured, or even sold, it will no longer be impossible.
This is especially noteworthy because Berkshire has rarely sold entire subsidiaries in its history. The most notable cases were the 2020 sale of the newspaper business and the earlier closure of the textile division in 1985. In Buffett’s era, most acquired companies were held permanently. But in Abel’s era, this unwritten rule may no longer fully apply.
If performance fails to meet the new leader’s standards, Berkshire’s future disposition of subsidiaries could be more flexible and disciplined than the market is used to. Abel is not aiming to overthrow Buffett but to transform Berkshire from an “exceptional company led by a genius founder” into a modern holding company that maintains its spirit but enhances execution and accountability.
He retains Berkshire’s most important genes: culture, insurance, concentrated investing, long-term holding, and capital discipline; but he is also adding his own mark: deeper operational involvement, greater emphasis on performance, willingness to address underperformers, and a higher likelihood of bold capital deployment at critical moments.
For investors, Abel’s true test has yet to come. It may only arrive during the next recession, liquidity crisis, or major acquisition opportunity, when the market will see whether this new leader can make the kind of bold, history-changing decisions Buffett is known for. But at least in these first 100 days, Berkshire’s new era has begun, and this successor does not seem content to merely maintain the status quo.