Santiago Caputo consolidates his control of the Argentine nuclear sector after Reidel's departure

The power structure behind Argentine nuclear policy changed significantly in February 2025. Santiago Caputo, the central political strategist of the government, managed to consolidate his influence over this strategic sector after Demian Reidel was removed from his position as head of Nucleoeléctrica SA (NASA). What seemed like a simple administrative transition was, in fact, a calculated operation to reconfigure control over the country’s three nuclear power plants.

Reidel, who served as president of NASA — the company operating Atucha I, Atucha II, and Embalse — faced allegations of irregularities in hiring processes, particularly in the bidding for cleaning services, which showed questionable overpricing. His background, combining training in physics and economics, as well as a personal friendship with President Javier Milei, proved unsuitable for Caputo’s plans. The strategist preferred a leadership more directly aligned with his directives. When Reidel finally stepped down in February, the government managed the transition smoothly: the physicist left without public statements, and Casa Rosada announced he agreed with the change.

The new structure: Ramos Napoli as executor of Caputo’s strategy

Federico Ramos Napoli, Secretary of Nuclear Affairs, took over NASA’s leadership. At just 30 years old, Napoli embodies precisely the technical profile Santiago Caputo needed: someone capable of implementing his operational management guidelines. Napoli surrounded his administration with a team of ten loyal officials and appointed Juan Martín Campos, a nuclear security specialist, to lead the technical operations of the plants.

The resulting power structure is clear: Napoli formally reports to Luis Caputo, Minister of Economy, whose portfolio includes NASA. However, his political boss is Santiago Caputo. To understand this dynamic, one must see it this way: in weekly meetings, the minister sets the “non-negotiable lines” for the company, but it is Santiago who defines the overall political strategy. Through this architecture, Caputo gains total control over the nuclear sector’s dynamics without appearing directly on the organizational chart.

Sources close to the government assured that “with Reidel’s departure, all nuclear policy was aligned in the same direction.” The new leadership team — also composed of Martín Porro, Diego Chaher, Diego Garde, and Javier Grinspun — is characterized by solid technical profiles and established professional trajectories. Unlike the previous administration, perceived as oriented toward grandiose projects with difficult implementation, this structure aims for feasible, operational objectives.

Nucleoeléctrica currently employs between 2,900 and 3,000 workers, mostly technical professionals. This is a significant point: the Argentine nuclear company maintains a predominantly professional workforce, with a smaller administrative staff, facilitating management based on technical rather than political criteria.

Nucleoeléctrica prepares for privatization between 2026 and 2027

The administrative restructuring is not accidental nor solely driven by operational efficiency concerns. Behind these changes is the privatization process of Nucleoeléctrica that the government has underway. The schedule is ambitious: the bidding terms are expected to be issued before the end of the year, with the award to a private partner expected before mid-2027.

The shareholding structure designed for privatization is specific: 5% for workers, 51% for the state (distributed between the Secretariat of Nuclear Affairs and the National Atomic Energy Commission), and 44% for private investment. Diego Chaher, head of the Public Companies Transformation Agency, leads this privatization process and reports politically to Santiago Caputo.

The government is not seeking just any buyer. It prefers a national or international actor with proven experience in the nuclear sector, ideally with plans to expand operational capacity, possibly including an additional reactor. The interest shown by a bipartisan U.S. delegation from the House Energy and Commerce Committee during a visit to the Atucha Nuclear Complex was described as a “routine visit” by official spokespeople, though they acknowledged a willingness to strengthen ties with the United States, at least regarding service provision and technology.

Atucha I and the technical challenges inherited from the previous administration

One of the critical tasks inherited by the new leadership was resolving delays accumulated during the previous management. Atucha I, which was shut down in September 2024 for life extension processes allowing it to operate for another two decades, faced significant obstacles causing delays of four to six months during 2025.

Government sources indicated that Reidel’s administration left no room for urgent issues, which even drew comments from the World Association of Nuclear Operators (WANO). The new administration’s goal is to have Atucha I back in operation before the 2028 summer, ideally by September 2027.

Internal assessments suggest that those responsible for the previous management lacked deep knowledge of the Argentine nuclear sector. “Everything was pulled out of thin air,” said a union source, referring both to the lack of expertise and to scandals over irregularities in hiring. Two managers, Marcelo Famá and Hernán Pantuso, were removed following investigations into overpricing in the cleaning bid.

The artificial intelligence project that failed under Reidel

During his administration, Reidel promoted an ambitious mega-project: positioning Argentina as the fourth global hub for Artificial Intelligence. Under his coordination, it was announced that OpenAI — the company behind ChatGPT — would build a large-scale data center dedicated to AI applications in Patagonia.

However, that project never moved beyond the planning stage. Both officials and union leaders agree that the initiative was too grandiose and had unrealistic timelines. “It was known it would fall apart on its own weight,” summarized an official source. While Reidel and his allies sought to attribute the failure to autonomous decisions by OpenAI, the reality suggests the project lacked the necessary foundations to succeed.

This failure exemplifies the differences between Santiago Caputo and Demian Reidel in their approach to governing the nuclear sector: while Reidel focused on high-profile initiatives with uncertain results, Caputo and his new team prioritize concrete operational objectives, technical viability, and preparing the company for entry into the private market. The restructuring of the nuclear sector thus reflects a strategic shift where efficiency and political governance are aligned toward clear, measurable goals.