Foresight News reports that c-node posted stating, “MPC, tFHE, and TEEs can build privacy applications that ZK cannot achieve, but the privacy strength is weaker. It is recommended to prioritize pure ZK for use cases such as payments, transfers, and voting.” Vitalik Buterin responded, saying, “ZK itself cannot provide coercion resistance; in scenarios like voting, it still requires the combination of trusted parties, MPC, FHE, or TEE to achieve this feature. We can enhance system security through layered architectures like ZK + FHE; even if FHE is compromised, all privacy attributes except coercion resistance can still be preserved. I suspect that similar situations also apply to almost all other cryptographic applications beyond zero-knowledge proofs.”
View Original
This page may contain third-party content, which is provided for information purposes only (not representations/warranties) and should not be considered as an endorsement of its views by Gate, nor as financial or professional advice. See Disclaimer for details.
Vitalik: ZK cannot provide coercion resistance and needs to be combined with techniques like FHE for layered use.
Foresight News reports that c-node posted stating, “MPC, tFHE, and TEEs can build privacy applications that ZK cannot achieve, but the privacy strength is weaker. It is recommended to prioritize pure ZK for use cases such as payments, transfers, and voting.” Vitalik Buterin responded, saying, “ZK itself cannot provide coercion resistance; in scenarios like voting, it still requires the combination of trusted parties, MPC, FHE, or TEE to achieve this feature. We can enhance system security through layered architectures like ZK + FHE; even if FHE is compromised, all privacy attributes except coercion resistance can still be preserved. I suspect that similar situations also apply to almost all other cryptographic applications beyond zero-knowledge proofs.”