Squid nega envolvimento no exploit do módulo do Gnosis Safe de US$ 3,2 milhões

Opening

A third-party module connected to the Gnosis Safe ecosystem was exploited across Ethereum and Base networks, draining approximately $3.2 million from 86 different Safes in two hours. The vulnerable contract, verified on Basescan as "SquidRouterModule," initially sparked confusion due to its name association with Squid protocol. However, Squid clarified that the contract was not built, deployed, or operated by the project, and that the module independently integrated with Squid and other protocols without direct project involvement. Security firms Blockaid and PeckShield were among the first to report details of the incident, which exploited a flaw in the module's signature verification mechanism.

Exploit Mechanics

The vulnerable module accepted a caller-supplied constant string as proof that a transaction message was secure. By passing this value, attackers were able to bypass signature verification mechanisms and execute arbitrary call data from victim wallets. This flaw gave attackers the ability to spend tokens held in affected Safes without requiring legitimate wallet approvals.

Security researchers determined that the exploit relied on Foundry-based exploit contracts that targeted the module's DelegateBundler execution path. According to Blockaid, the attackers impersonated authorized delegates tied to each Safe and initiated arbitrary token swaps through Uniswap V3 liquidity pools.

Asset Conversion and Current Status

The stolen assets were converted into an attacker-created worthless token known as "u" through specially seeded liquidity pools controlled by the exploiter. After routing the assets through these pools, the attacker removed liquidity and consolidated the proceeds into approximately 3.07 million DAI. PeckShield stated that the funds are currently being held in a wallet beginning with "0xa447...54859."

Esclarecimento da Squid

A Squid criticou os primeiros reportes públicos que conectaram incorretamente o exploit diretamente ao seu protocolo. O cofundador pseudônimo da Squid, Fig, afirmou que o módulo comprometido era não relacionado à infraestrutura central da Squid. De acordo com a equipe, a principal arquitetura do roteador do protocolo permaneceu completamente separada e não foi afetada pelo exploit. A Squid explicou que o contrato vulnerável apenas compartilhava o nome Squid e fez integrações independentes com vários protocolos, incluindo Squid, sem envolvimento direto do projeto em si.