Five Sins of the EOS Foundation "Eating the Last Resort": Burning Money, Black Box, Shifting Blame, and Trust Collapse

Original Title: Vaulta Foundation “Eating the Last Straw” Record: Coin Price Big Dump, Audit Disappearance, Community Trust Completely Collapsed

Original Author: MMK (@mmk_btc), Vaulta Community Member

Original edit by: Rhythm Xiaogong, Rhythm BlockBeats

Editor’s Note: Many people know about EOS, which raised $4.2 billion in a grand financing round 7 years ago and was regarded as one of the earliest “Ethereum killers”. However, what many people do not know is that after BM was pushed out of EOS, the parent company Block.one took the funds raised earlier and focused on creating the IPO trading platform Bullish. The remaining EOS was taken over by the EOS Network Foundation, whose CEO Yves La Rose is nicknamed “Big Beard” by the community due to his thick beard. Subsequently, under the leadership of Big Beard, EOS was renamed Vaulta, shifting its focus to Web3 banking services, and the EOS Network Foundation was also renamed Vaulta Foundation. Recently, Big Beard's sudden departure has caused dissatisfaction in the community, leading to accusations regarding his past actions.

The Vaulta Foundation (formerly EOS Network Foundation) is experiencing an unprecedented collapse of trust in its history: after burning tens of millions of dollars over four years, the coin price continues to hit new lows; projects have successively failed, and the ledger has gone from public to unupdated; the management has “resigned gracefully,” yet the authority has not been handed over for a long time… This article will unveil the various mysteries of Vaulta and tell a story of desperation.

Yves resigns: a dignified exit or behind-the-scenes “regency”?

On November 12, 2025, Yves La Rose, the former CEO of the Vaulta Foundation (formerly known as the EOS Network Foundation, hereinafter referred to as VF), suddenly announced his resignation on the X platform, stating that he had informed the 21 Block Producers of the network on October 29 that he would voluntarily step down and that new representatives would be elected through on-chain governance. The statement was worded gracefully, filled with “gratitude” and “vision,” but the community was astonished to discover weeks later that the core multi-signature account of Vaulta was still controlled by Yves, and there was no handover at all.

Yves's personal resignation statement

Not only that, but after resigning, Yves secretly pushed for Greymass founder Aaron Cox to take over his position. As a result, the first thing Aaron was thrust into the spotlight for was to initiate a massive proposal of 10 million $A (EOS) to continue funding the core development budget. This move sparked widespread questioning in the community: this is simply using a figurehead to “extend life,” diverting remaining public funds.

Charge 1: Spending extravagantly, the direction of marketing expenses remains a mystery

Since VF was established in 2021, the ecological development has not accelerated over time.

On the contrary, the community sees another disturbing curve: the budget expands year by year, while the results shrink year by year.

VF launched a market expansion plan under the name “Ecological Revitalization” in 2022-2023. VF has indeed recruited an excellent marketing team, who have also made efforts in brand operation and international events.

But the key question is - what exactly have these extravagant investments brought?

According to the disclosed nine quarterly reports, the marketing-related expenses (PR & Marketing) amounted to: Q4 2022, with promotional expenses reaching $1,709,800; Q1 2023, an additional $1,072,887.

In just 6 months, nearly $2.8 million was invested in brand promotion and public relations activities. However, the results the community can see are only: number of conference attendees, photos and reports; Twitter follower growth; 2000 days without downtime; EVM performance stress testing;

These data are not meaningless, but they are more like PR slides rather than a real ecological status. Developer growth? None. Daily on-chain activity? Not disclosed. TVL? Almost nonexistent. Why is it that the more is spent, the lower the community awareness? When all reports only talk about “highlights” and not about “results,” transparency naturally slips into a black box.

Charge 2: Issuing money immediately upon taking office, Greymass's five million budget controversy continues.

In June 2024, VF allocated 15 million $A EOS ( to establish the “Middleware Special Fund,” of which the first batch of 5 million ) EOS $A was allocated to the Greymass team, and the remaining 10 million is currently still in the eosio.mware account.

On-chain data shows: funds were transferred from the foundation eosio.mware account to the newly established account uxuiuxuiuxui of Greymass; subsequently, this wallet transfers to the http://funds.gm account on a monthly basis, with a note “Operation + USD/CAD price”, resembling “salary distribution”; then, http://funds.gm transfers to http://rewards.gm, which are ultimately distributed to several accounts such as jesta, inconsistent, http://apporc.gm, etc., with transfer records noted as “Reward Payout + USD amount”; most salary accounts quickly cash out to exchanges like krakenkraken or Coinbase after receiving.

rewards.gm On-chain transfer records (data source)

Additional explanation: The “middleware” built by Greymass refers to the infrastructure tools that simplify the account creation and interaction process.

Although the Greymass team released several development updates in the early stages of funding, there have been almost no technical achievements or interim summaries published in the past year. In particular, there are still many technical issues with the compatibility and stability of Greymass's middleware tools, which have not yet been widely adopted by mainstream developers.

The focus of the community's doubts is: Is there any opaque behavior such as duplicate salaries and accounts of unknown identity receiving wages for the 5 million (EOS)? Is the funding allocation closely coinciding with Aaron's tenure, raising suspicions of “self-approved budgets”? Does the salary distribution structure lack third-party supervision? We do not deny the contributions that Greymass has made to ecological development, nor do we deny Aaron's early technical reputation. But has there been misguidance in the new policy? Has it deviated from the original development intention after losing oversight?

There is no conclusion to these issues.

It can be confirmed that the silence and low output of the “Greymass 5 Million Project” have made it difficult to respond to the external trust crisis, further exacerbating the community's doubts about the rationality of the foundation's use of funds.

$A Charge Three: Coin price big dump, the foundation “silenced”, responsibility became a blind spot

If technological achievements can be debated and marketing effects can be quantified, then the token price is the most honest indicator.

This year ( EOS ) has experienced a big dump all the way down, hitting a low of 0.21 USD — a danger signal sufficient to put any ecosystem on red alert. However, amidst the community's continuous inquiries, the response from the foundation has always been: “The coin price is not within the responsibilities of the foundation.”

This statement cannot be refuted.

Technical organizations are not obligated to manipulate the market. But the contradiction is that when all ecological indicators decline and community confidence collapses, there is no discussion of any “stabilization expectations” or “market protection mechanisms” from the foundation.

What followed was an even more unsettling action: the foundation announced its “dissolution,” with no roadmap and no handover plan.

The community's doubt is not whether the foundation should be responsible for the coin price, but rather: at this critical moment when the ecosystem is in a trust crisis, why choose to withdraw: is it due to inability, indifference, or are there some issues that are inconvenient to face? Responsibility has disappeared in this big dump.

Charge Four: From weekly updates to complete silence, transparency has vanished without a trace.

When VF was just established, transparency was once its biggest selling point.

2021: Weekly updates (Everything EOS Weekly Report) to report progress to the community in real-time;

2022: Monthly Yield Report, a bit of laxity for a few months, but still acceptable;

2023: Quarterly Report (ENF Quarterly report)

2024: Silence… …

2025: Silence… …

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According to the published report data, VF had the highest expenditure in the fourth quarter of 2022, reaching $7,885,340; thereafter, expenditures gradually decreased in subsequent quarters.

However, these reports often only disclose the total amount, lacking detailed classification and breakdown, making it difficult for outsiders to determine the flow of funds. The community has long had concerns about the huge expenditures and lack of transparency in information.

The report repeatedly mentions plans such as the Grant Framework and Pomelo, but they were “suspended” in 2023; meanwhile, the promised fund management dedicated to specific projects in the white paper has also not been executed in detail or publicly settled, and the whereabouts of the funds after being allocated to the exchange remain a mystery.

This break in transparency and years of extravagance ultimately led to community confidence falling to rock bottom.

From intensive disclosure to gradually sparse information, and now to a complete halt, the disappearance of transparency almost perfectly aligns with the curve of ecological enthusiasm.

It is worth noting that after Q1 2024, no further financial reports will be released. There will be no financial audits, no budget distribution, no project lists, and no outstanding allocations.

The community is forced to accept a fact: the operation of the foundation has shifted from “high-frequency transparency” to “complete black box.”

At the same time, many of the collaboration projects that VF had previously promoted have mostly stalled at the “communication stage,” lacking actual implementation. The once-promised “transparent operations” have ultimately degenerated into a silent cliff.

) Charge Five: Discretionary funding, Grants have become a “black hole,” and no one knows where the money went.

In the early days of the foundation, VF indeed attempted to rebuild the Vaulta (EOS) ecosystem through various funding programs, including the Grant Framework, Recognition Grants, and the public funding pool used in conjunction with Pomelo.

At that stage, the speed of fund disbursement was fast and the scale was large, intending to “quickly stop the bleeding.”

We cannot deny that it did play a role in boosting morale in the early stages.

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Here is an additional explanation about Grants: VF grants are divided into publicly recruited “Grant Framework” (milestone-based grants), aimed at individuals, teams, or companies, mostly for technical projects; Recognition Grants (awards given to projects) and distribution of ecological projects through public funding channels such as Pomelo. In other words, grants can be used for both profit-making projects and public goods/public welfare projects.

For example——in the first report of Q4 2021, VF allocated a one-time amount of:

Recognition Grants of 3.5 million USD (averaging 100,000 USD per project);

$1.3 million funding for five technical working groups to prepare a white paper;

$1.265 million supports the community autonomous organization EdenOnEOS;

500,000 USD as the funding pool for the first season of Pomelo;

However, the problem is that this is also the only complete disclosure of the grant recipients for VF in all allocations over the next four years.

From Q4 2021 to Q4 2023, although Grants have consistently been the largest item in quarterly expenditures (in some quarters even accounting for 40%~60% of total expenditures), the report stated: no longer disclosing specific grant recipients; not publishing the actual amounts received for each project; not revealing the project acceptance status; not mentioning the details of fund usage; not clarifying whether the projects have delivered results according to milestones;

In other words, the numbers are still there, but the information has disappeared.

Only the first quarter report disclosed the funding flows of each project. In the subsequent eight reports, the grant expenditures of Grants remained the “largest portion,” but no longer detailed the beneficiary projects or outcomes.

You can see how much money is spent, but where the money goes, no one will ever know.

Does funding really drive the ecosystem? Is the money being used effectively? Are the projects delivered as promised? Why does the foundation never disclose more information?

It raises questions: Did the foundation from the very beginning use the banner of “ecological funding” to spend a large amount of money? Externally, it buys off the community and wins people’s hearts, while internally it holds inflationary funds and reserves, lacking results and oversight.

The total amount of funds in the VF matching pool exceeds ten million dollars, but most projects have extremely rare updates and even go silent after receiving the funds.

) The end of another era

The Vaulta Foundation once promised governance reform with a stance of “transparency and community-driven,” but over the past four years, it has gradually moved towards closure and corruption.

From Yves's dignified resignation without handing over power, to the 5 million ### EOS ( middleware funding being unaccountable, from the ineffective millions spent on marketing each quarter, to the complete silence after ecological funding—this is not the failure of “decentralized governance,” but the victory of “centralized plunder.”

This long article is a list of charges, and also a warning document.

The collapse of Vaulta is not just a tragedy for EOS, but also a microcosm of the trampling of Web3 ideals.